

RUNTIME DETECTION OF A BANDWIDTH DENIAL ATTACK FROM A
ROGUE NETWORK-ON-CHIP

by

Rajesh JayashankaraShridevi

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Approved:

Dr. Koushik Chakraborty
Major Professor

Dr. Sanghamitra Roy
Committee Member

Dr. Rajnikant Sharma
Committee Member

Dr. Mark R. McLellan
Vice President for Research and
Dean of the School of Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah

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Abstract

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Rajesh JayashankaraShridevi, Master of Science

Utah State University, 2015

Major Professor: Dr. Koushik Chakraborty
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering

Network-on-Chip, the de-facto industry standard for connecting on-chip components in forthcoming System-on-Chips plays a central role in providing a robust, reliable and secure communication fabric. Conceptual similarities of NoCs to well established *computer networks* makes the former vulnerable to security threats similar to those confronted during the evolution of computer networks. Further, growing importance of NoC has triggered a constant scrimmage between exploiting new potent security threats and identification of techniques to prevent these threats.

This work explores a covert threat model for multi-processor system on chips designed using 3rd party NoCs. The proposed malicious NoC can disrupt the availability of on-chip resources, thereby causing large performance bottlenecks for software running on MPSoC platform. This research rationalizes the potency and relevance of such threat and propose techniques that enables a MPSoC integrator to monitor the trustworthiness of the deployed NoC throughout the chip lifetime.

(56 pages)

Public Abstract

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Chips with high computational power are the crux of today's pervasive complex digital systems. Microprocessor circuits are evolving towards many core designs with the integration of hundreds of processing cores, memory elements and other devices on a single chip to sustain high performance computing while maintaining low design costs. Two decisive paradigm shifts in the semiconductor industry have made this evolution possible: (a) *architectural* and (b) *organizational*.

At the heart of the *architectural* innovation is a scalable high speed data communication structure, the *network-on-chip* (NoC). NoC is an interconnect network for the glueless integration of on-chip components in the modern complex communication centric designs. In the recent days, NoC has replaced the traditional bus based architecture owing to its structured and modular design, scalability and low design cost. The *organizational* revolution has resulted in a globalized and collaborative supply chain with pervasive use of third party intellectual properties to reduce the time-to-market and overall design costs.

Despite the advantages of these paradigm shifts, modern system-on-chips pose a plethora of security vulnerabilities. This work explores a threat model arising from a malicious NoC IP embedded with a hardware trojan affecting the resource availability of on-chip components. A rigorous simulation infrastructure is established to evaluate

the feasibility and potency of such an attack. Further, a non-invasive runtime monitoring technique is proposed and thoroughly investigated to ensure the trustworthiness of a third party NoC IP with low overheads.

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Acronyms

| | |
|-------|-----------------------------------|
| 3PIP | third party intellectual property |
| CDF | cumulative distribution function |
| DoS | denial of service |
| FN | false negative |
| FP | false positive |
| IC | integrated circuit |
| IP | intellectual property |
| MPSoC | multiprocessor system-on-chip |
| NLD | network latency differential |
| NoC | network-on-chip |
| PAP | proximal analogous packet |
| QoS | quality of service |
| RLAN | runtime latency auditor for NoC |
| rNoC | rogue network-on-chip |
| SoC | system-on-chip |
| TTM | time-to-market |
| VC | virtual channel |

Chapter 1

Introduction

Emerging global semiconductor environment represents a competitive arena where the *collaborative innovation model* grows in prominence to sustain ubiquitous computing. In the modern economic landscape, tightening supply chain budgets and growing design complexity are the by-products of the semiconductor industry's doctrine: *smaller, faster and cheaper*. A remarkable technology trend that captures this interplay is the rapid growth in demand for multi-processor system on chips (MPSoC) [1, 2]. With unprecedented pressure of time-to-market, modern MPSoCs integrate many different *Third Party Intellectual Property (3PIP)* components within a single die. These components are obtained from a diverse pool of design houses, with a wide array of in-built functionality. Needless to say, such a practice has far reaching implications toward the security and trustworthiness of an entire chip [3–5]. Security assurance and verification of 3PIPs are challenging due to the limited design information available from the respective 3PIP providers who want to preserve their technological innovations. Consequently, many existing techniques based on internal signal inspection are useless for detecting trojans embedded in 3PIP (e.g., [6]).

While many components in an MPSoC can be 3PIP, including the processing elements, hardware accelerators, and memory modules, recent trends show a growing use of 3PIP on-chip interconnects. Vast majority of these interconnect designs employ *Network-on-Chip (NoC)*, which facilitates glue-less integration of various hardware modules within a single substrate. For example, Arteris, a NoCs IP provider, has experienced a tremendous growth of 797% in their sales over the last few years [7]. Given this trend, it is now critical to carefully consider the security implications of a 3PIP NoC in an MPSoC.

NoC 3PIPs present several unique challenges in trustworthy computing, compared to 3PIP processing elements, hardware accelerators, and memory modules. First, a NoC has

direct access to all the components in a SoC, and therefore plays a central role in resource availability of a chip. Second, unlike processing elements or specialized components, there is only one instance of a NoC in a MPSoC. Consequently, validating its security assurance and performance guarantee becomes hard, as one cannot deploy 3PIP trustworthiness based on replicated execution [1]. These unique aspects conspire to create a *perfect security storm* when the NoC assumes a malicious role in a MPSoC. A rogue 3PIP NoC (*rNoC*) can cause a plethora of damages like data corruption, denial of service, and information stealing.

A secure system must provide three central aspects of trustworthiness: *confidentiality*, *integrity* and *availability* [8]. This research focuses on the impact of *rNoCs* maliciously manipulating the *availability* of on-chip resources through a focused bandwidth denial attack in the NoC. Such an attack can directly translate to application performance degradation in modern many-core systems as they employ rudimentary in-order cores that lack the ability to tolerate large on-chip communication latency [9,10]. Using rigorous circuit-architectural methodology, it is demonstrated that a potent *rNoC* can be designed with a negligible footprint. Further, to counter this imminent threat, a novel run-time technique is proposed to detect this attack and ascertain the trustworthiness of a NoC.

1.1 Organization of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:

- **Background:** Chapter 2 equips the reader with necessary basics on the network-on-chip and the backdrop of the system-on-chip (SoC) supply chain flow to reveal the security loopholes. In order to show the novelty of this research, a thorough review of the contemporary research in SoC and 3PIP security is presented.
- **rNoC Design:** In Chapter 3, the implementation details of the proposed threat model is discussed. The *rNoC*'s potency and design footprint is investigated to show the trojan's feasibility and significance in modern SoC environment.

- **RLAN Design:** Chapter 4 details the proposed runtime latency monitoring technique to detect a focused bandwidth denial attack. The variants and scalability of the non-invasive trojan detection technique are discussed in detail.
- **Methodology:** Chapter 5 describes the simulation infrastructure and the tools used to evaluate the threat model and monitoring technique.
- **Results:** In Chapter 6, the efficacy of the proposed monitoring technique is evaluated along with the overheads incurred for the security assurance of a 3PIP NoC. The results indicate modest overheads of 12.73% in area, 9.84% in power and 5.4% in terms of network latency.
- **Conclusion:** Chapter 7 concludes by highlighting the contribution of this research and its significance in the modern MPSoC environment.

Chapter 2

Background

This chapter aims to establish the bedrock for the research presented in this thesis. Section 2.1 presents an outline on the concepts of NoC and emphasizes on the advantages of the NoC fabric in emerging MPSoCs. Section 2.2 scrutinizes the *collaborative innovation model* and *globalized supply chain* adopted by the semiconductor industry to sustain high performance computing. It further outlines the security loopholes that have surfaced as a by-product of the newly adopted system-on-chip (SoC) supply chain model.

The comprehensive review of contemporary research presented in Section 2.3, underlines the novelty and importance of this research.

2.1 Network-on-chip

Network-on-chip is a layered and scalable on-chip communication fabric designed to replace the traditional bus and crossbar based interconnection platforms in modern many-core systems. Basic NoCs heavily borrow the concepts and techniques from the age-old distributed computer networks paradigm. Critical parameters such as performance, power consumption and reliability along with the fundamental differences between the on-chip networks and computer networks has shaped the research in NoC domain. To fully comprehend the operation and importance of a NoC, the section is further subdivided to briefly outline the evolution of NoC (Section 2.1.1), present a conceptual view of NoC, its components and operation (Section 2.1.2) and finally highlight the merits of NoC (Section 2.1.3).

2.1.1 Evolution of NoC

The advent of sub nanometer semiconductor processing technology along with high

density transistor integration brought about several critical challenges to the fore. Firstly, to meet the resource demands of growing computation-intensive applications and to sustain high performance, the number of on-chip components and the design complexity of a computing system increased exponentially. Secondly, with technology scaling, global interconnect design issues of delay, power consumption, noise, scalability and reliability began to plague the complex MPSoC designs. Thirdly, the traditional shared bus based on-chip communication architectures where bus accesses by all connected components are serialized, reached the limits of scalability. All these factors colluded together to cause a critical bottleneck in system integration and productivity. To counter these crucial issues and sustain high performance, researchers and industry experts conceived a shift in the architectural paradigm (i.e, birth of on-chip interconnection network) as well as in the organizational paradigm (growth of the collaborative innovation, described in Section 2.2). The birth of interconnection network encouraged the addition of more on-chip components. Swiftly, NoC flourished as the de-facto standard for on-chip communication in modern many-core computing systems.

2.1.2 Conceptual View of the NoC

Figure 2.1 illustrates the paradigm shift from bus based architecture to NoCs in many-core systems as discussed above. A typical NoC constitutes multiple routers and network interfaces (NI) that connect different intellectual property (IP) blocks through physical links (wires). An IP block and NI are together known as a tile/node. A closer look at the building blocks of a NoC follows:

- **Router** : A typical NoC router consists of buffers, an interconnection matrix, functional and control units. Figure 2.2 shows the block diagram of a typical virtual-channel router broadly partitioned as *datapath* and *control plane*. The *datapath* consists of input buffers, crossbar and the output buffers and as the name suggests it handles the storage and movement of packets of data/signal. The *control plane* on the other hand, consists of route calculation, virtual channel (VC) allocation and switch alloca-




Fig. 2.1: Paradigm shift from bus based architecture to interconnect networks. Bus based architecture design connecting a few cores (e.g., Intel nehalem) was replaced by NoC centric designs connecting many cores (e.g., Intel SCC). To maintain high performance computing at low design cost emphasis is shifting towards pervasive use of 3rd party IPs.

tion blocks. These blocks make decisions pertaining to the route taken by the packets and also manage arbitration and resource allocation when multiple packets contend for limited physical resources.

Each flit¹ of a packet² arrives at the input buffers of a router from an upstream router. The route computation module determines the output port to which the packet must be forwarded. The packet then requests for an output virtual channel and the VC allocation module allocates the required resource after evaluating all requests. The switch allocation module provides a time slot during which each flit of a packet is forwarded from the input buffers to the output port. Finally, the flits are transmitted from the output buffers to the downstream router's input port.

- **Network Interface** : NI serves as the interface between the communication network and the IP blocks. NI generally handles the packetization, packet re-ordering and

¹Flit: Flow control digit, is the smallest unit of data recognized by the flow control method

²Packet: A fixed length of flits, that encapsulates the information to be transmitted along with destination address and other critical information




Fig. 2.2: Block diagram of typical virtual channel NoC router.

retransmissions. It splits the incoming data into packets and augments critical information required for routing the packets to the correct destination. Along with the destination address, the NI can augment error detection/correction information and any other monitoring information required by the designer into the packet header. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example packet format for the NoC.

- **Link** : Links are the physical wires connecting the routers in a network. There exists two kinds of links: serial and parallel.

NoCs can be tuned in a variety of parameters such as topology, buffering, data widths, arbitration techniques, routing algorithms, etc. based on the application requirement. An




Fig. 2.3: A typical packet format used in NoC communication.

overview of important architectural aspects follows:

- **Topology** : Topology determines the physical layout and the connections between network components. Figure 2.4 illustrates some of the well-known topologies. The topology choice depends on the cost-performance trade off of the applications.
- **Routing** : Routing algorithms compute the path taken by the data from the source to destination. Routing algorithms have been efficiently used to increase performance under different load scenarios (congestion based routing algorithms e.g., [11–13] among others), provide fault tolerance (e.g., [14–16], etc.) and improve reliability [17,18].
- **Flow Control** : Flow control ensures the effective utilization of network resources such as buffers and link bandwidth, thereby play a critical role in determining the performance and power consumption of a NoC. Some typical flow control techniques are circuit-switching (message based), store-and-forward (packet based) and wormhole (flit based).

2.1.3 Advantages of NoC

A summary of the benefits of the NoC architecture in modern MPSoCs are as follows:




Fig. 2.4: Examples for network-on-chip topologies: 3x3 mesh, 3x3 torus, 3-fly-2-ary butterfly and irregular network.

- **Abstraction** : NoCs provide a clear demarcation between computation and communication in a MPSoC.
- **Structured and Customizable** : The NoC topology, buffer size, data widths, routing algorithms and various other parameters are customizable according to application requirement and have a lower complexity due to a structured design.
- **Parallelism** : Concurrent spatial reuse of links and routers allow parallelism in data flow.
- **Scalable** : NoC architecture can be scaled to accommodate hundreds of on-chip components. They exhibit better performance under load as communication flows can be handled in parallel.
- **Wire Routing Congestion** : NoC significantly reduces the number of wires required to route data and signals in a SoC thereby increasing wire utilization and efficiency.
- **Modular** : NoC architecture makes it easy to swap different IP blocks and create derivative chips based on the need of each application. This in turn reduces the time-to-market (TTM) due the modular nature of system design and increases productivity.

2.2 Collaborative Innovation Model in the Semiconductor Industry

Globalization, rapidly changing consumer demands, shrinking product life cycles and fierce competition has changed the dynamics and organization of the semiconductor industry's supply chain. Integrated circuits (IC) are no longer designed and manufactured by the same firm but the IC/SoC supply chain is distributed worldwide. Modern SoC designs are a combination of numerous on-chip devices that come from various third party design houses as well as those designed in-house. To keep pace with the consumer demands, constantly reduce the time-to-market(TTM) and at the same time reduce cost of design and manufacturing in the competitive market, semiconductor industry has adopted a globalized collaborative innovation model where firms specialize in a specific stage or

specific component in the SoC design flow. Hence, many firms must work together to develop, manufacture and supply a finished IC. Figure 2.5 illustrates the globally distributed SoC design flow. The figure also shows that there are multiple stages within the supply chain which are untrustworthy. The globalized supply chain is vulnerable to many different security threats such as IP piracy, reverse engineering, counterfeiting, insertion of hardware trojans, etc. Researchers, academicians and industry experts have explored an overabundance of threat models, metrics and remedies, but with the exponential growth in the use of 3PIPs and deeper understanding of devices, more covert and potent threat models are conceived. With billions of dollars spent for security assurance in today's environment, it is imperative to investigate low cost and low overhead techniques to strengthen the trustworthiness and ensure secure system designs.

2.3 Literature Review

This section presents a comprehensive study of contemporary works related to this research. As seen above, security assurance of on-chip hardware components is an obstacle of growing magnitude and importance. The contemporary research in hardware security




Fig. 2.5: Block diagram illustrating the SoC design flow.

can be broadly classified on three major axes based on their underlying assumptions:

- *Stage of trojan insertion* : Hardware trojans can be embedded in the integrated circuit in many stages during the life cycle of chip design and manufacturing process (Section 2.3.1).
- *Source of threat* : A potent hardware trojan can be effectively embedded in any of the numerous on-chip components such as the processing elements, memory, hardware accelerators, communication network, etc. (Section 2.3.2).
- *Nature and potency of security violation* : The nature of attack is limited only by the trojan designer's imagination and the trojan's source. A plethora of potent attacks such as *information stealing, total chip failure, data manipulation, resource availability*, etc. can be envisaged (Section 2.3.3).

The first and second component can be assessed by inspecting the threat model proposed in the work, where as the third component can be determined by understanding the malicious activity from the perspective of the security properties of a system—confidentially, integrity, and availability.

2.3.1 Stage of Trojan Insertion

Several recent works protect against untrusted foundries by detecting malicious circuit modifications (e.g., [19–24] among others). Further, there has also been research to avoid cloning the chip design and counterfeiting using physically unclonable functions (PUF) (e.g., [25–29], among others). But as semiconductor industry adopts the *collaborative innovation* model, these mechanisms are ineffective to protect against design time malicious 3PIP in an MPSoC. To offer security in such a scenario Chen et al. proposed task duplication so as to verify the validity of one execution [1]. While this work is an important step forward in 3PIP security assurance, research in this domain needs immediate attention to design novel and scalable solutions with low overhead.

2.3.2 Source of Threat

Security researchers and trojan designers have explored embedding the hardware trojan in a variety of on-chip components. An overabundance of research focused on detection of trojans in processing and storage elements (e.g., [30–43]). As computing systems evolved with the addition of more on-chip components research on hardware security broadened with the aim to ensure trustworthiness. Similarly, with the advent of NoC, research on NoC security gathered steam. Section 2.3.4 summarizes the recent works in NoC security, highlighting the novelty and importance of the research presented in this thesis.

2.3.3 Nature and Potency of Attack

Hardware trojans can be designed to violate one of the three central aspects of trustworthiness: (a) *confidentiality*, (b) *integrity*, and (c) *availability*. Trojans that attack the confidentiality of a system aim to steal data from on-chip devices either through direct information leakage or side channel analysis of signals and circuit behavior. Demme et al. investigated metrics to measure information leakage attacks [44] while many research works focused on detection and prevention of such attacks [45, 46]. Though theft of data is the most profitable attack for a trojan designer, there have been several cases of covert data manipulation. Previous works explore techniques to ensure data integrity in storage memories [42, 47] and program code integrity [30, 48, 49]. Another class of trojans influence the availability of resources, making them unavailable when the system demands it. Denial-of-service attacks are the most common type of attacks that affect resource availability. The potency of these trojan attacks can range from simple loss of performance and energy efficiency to catastrophic system wide irreversible failures.

2.3.4 NoC Security

A vast majority of recent works assume a *secure* NoC, where the threat is assumed to rise from the software or the processing elements. *Data Protection Unit (DPU)* proposed by Fiorin et al. [50] and *Secure Network Interface (SNI)* by Diguet et al. [51]) are two such

works that analyze secure access control on memory banks. Few works employ encrypted data transmission over the NoC (e.g., [52, 53]) or partition the NoC into separate zones based on trust [54, 55]. On the other hand, some works have looked into creating efficient chip resource partitioning to isolate secure and non-secure applications [54, 56]. These works are also primarily concerned with the *confidentiality* of the data transmitted on the system. Another class of works inspects security threats violating the *availability* of the on-chip NoC bandwidth, and explores techniques within the scope of a secure NoC. Diguët et al.'s work on SNI can protect from denial of service (DoS) attack caused by replay, livelock, deadlock and incorrect path. Fiorin et al. propose the use of DoS probe as a part of the NoC monitoring architecture [57]. Parallel to these works in security, there have been numerous proposals to provide quality of service (QoS) guarantees in a NoC [58]. While these works are conceptually closer to the work presented in this thesis, the proposed mechanisms are impractical for the threat model explored in this work, as the NoCs derived from a 3PIP cannot be modified. Similarly, recent work by Ancajas et al. explores a *rNoC* [59], but their threat model and protection mechanisms are focused on *confidentiality* and are unable to detect or thwart malicious manipulation of resource *availability* from a *rNoC*. Table 2.1 summarizes the different threat in NoCs.

This work explores a new threat model based on a key underlying assumption: a *rogue NoC* manipulating the *availability* of the on-chip communication bandwidth. With NoCs being such an integral part of present and future MPSoCs, the need to investigate trustworthiness of a third party NoC IP is immense. The work presented here is distinct from contemporary secure 3PIP works, primarily in two aspects.

- In the light of proliferation of 3PIP NoCs, this research explores a threat where the NoC is malicious. Consequently, unlike a majority of existing works, the security measures cannot be placed inside the NoC architecture.
- The threat model presented in this research is concerned with the *availability* of on-chip resources.

Table 2.1: Comparison of Threats in NoCs.

| | Trojan Location^a | Attack^b | Protection^c | Activation^d |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| rNoC(<i>This work</i>) | NoC | Malign IP | NI | Time |
| DPU [50] [57] | S/W | IT(<i>Mem</i>)/DC/DoS | NI | — |
| surfNoC [54] | S/W | IT(S/W) | NoC | — |
| AE [53] | S/W | IT(<i>Mem</i>) | NI | — |
| IMP [60] | μ P | IT(μ P/ <i>Mem</i>) | — | S/W |
| NoC-MPU [61] | S/W | IT(<i>Mem</i>) | NI | — |

^a The part of the system where a *trojan* is inserted.

^b The type of attack carried out in the NoC.(*IT*-Information Theft,*DoS*-Denial of Service)

^c The part of the system where a *protection* mechanism is implemented to prevent an attack.

^d The *activation* mechanism employed in case of a hardware trojan.

Chapter 3

rNoC design

This Chapter discusses the design of the proposed rogue NoC (rNoC), elaborating on its operational phases (Section 3.1), and the router micro-architecture modifications required for the implementation of the trojan (Section 3.2). Further, Section 3.3 discusses the threat posed by a *rNoC* for the SoC integrators and other IP providers, demonstrates the potency of the proposed *rNoC* design and motivates the need for research in this domain. The trojan design overhead is evaluated in terms of area and power to show that a potent *rNoC* can be designed with negligible footprint.

3.1 Operational Phases

A *rNoC* broadly follows a set of phases as described below.

- *Trojan insertion*: The NoC 3PIP provider creates a *rNoC* by inserting a malicious circuit in the NoC router during the design or verification phase. The Trojan is designed to engage in a *focused bandwidth denial attack* targeting either one or a few key on-chip resources. This threat model can be realized by one or two malicious design and verification engineers in the NoC IP design team [6].
- *Identifying Client*: The NoC provider must then identify a client SoC integrator to supply a rogue version of their IP. At first glance, this may appear counter-productive as clearly the NoC IP provider may lose their SoC integrator client eventually. However, given the growing role of a NoC 3PIP, other SoC integrators may pay off the NoC IP provider for monopolizing a niche market. For example, in Figure 3.3, SoC Integrator 3 might pay off the NoC provider to victimize SoC Integrator 4, and steal its clients. The notion of a disgruntled employee inserting a malicious design or a sabotage from competitors to harm the company's prospects is not new. Such practices have seen

the light of the day in other industries including the software domain [62, 63], and it is not unreasonable to expect a similar trend in the hardware domain.

- *Activation and Operation*: The trojan can employ a variety of subtle activation mechanisms as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Once activated, the trojan engages in a subtle bandwidth denial attack on a few selected on-chip nodes or processing elements (PE). While a *rNoC* can cause a catastrophic chip failure (e.g., intentionally dropping every packet), this research assumes that the role of the *rNoC* here is more subtle. In this mode, the *rNoC* aims to cause performance degradation at the application level, to implicate a potentially inferior IP/chip design, rather than a fundamentally incorrect design.

3.2 Realizing a rNoC

To realize a *rNoC*, the router micro-architecture is modified, and the arbitration protocol is augmented with the trojan functionality. A standard NoC router with a typical 4-stage pipeline is chosen as the baseline. The four pipeline stages of the NoC router are input buffer, route calculation, VC allocation and switch traversal as seen in Figure 3.1. The control and data path of the trojan are fed to various router pipe stages to allow covert manipulation of the router functionality. The trojan has three major modules: *activation*, *victim IP selection*, and *traffic flow manipulation*, outlined next.

3.2.1 Activation Module

Trojan activation modes are broadly classified under *external* and *internal* [24]. Externally-activated triggers rely on the interaction with the outside world and hence require medium to communicate or access data to/from external environment. Use of antenna, sensors, input/output peripherals, etc. are the common modes of external activation. In the case of a 3PIP NoC, specific nature and content of interaction with external environment cannot be guaranteed at design time by the IP vendor and hence must effectively rely on internal triggers. A variety of internal triggers can be envisaged (e.g., logic/condition based, time




Fig. 3.1: rNoC router with the embedded hardware trojan.

based, temperature/voltage based, supply noise based, internal counter based triggers). Trojan activation can also be achieved using other methods such as software-hardware coalition [59,60] or triggered using traffic activity and traffic patterns in the network. Since 3PIPs allow limited opportunity for introspection, a smart designer can carefully create an activation module that can elude existing trojan detection techniques.

3.2.2 Victim IP Selection

The challenge in victim IP selection is finding a victim node such that applications running on the node can perceive a noticeable performance drop. In a large network topology, this can be a complicated problem. For example, consider a case where a *rNoC* selects a node randomly. If the applications running on the chip rarely send/receive traffic from this chosen victim node, then there will be virtually no impact. A trojan design that can dynamically identify a node with a heavy network traffic is investigated in this research.

Figure 3.2 shows the proposed design. A major goal of this design is to enable scalability and to limit the area/power footprint of the trojan. A hierarchical process that tracks only a handful of node activities at any given time is employed. Each node monitors its




Fig. 3.2: Hierarchical approach for Victim Selection in rNoC. In stage 1, aggregate bandwidth information of the region is collected and in stage 2, the victim node is identified based on high usage rates.

ingress and egress rates, and then sends an activity report containing the bandwidth consumption information periodically to a central node. The central node accumulates the aggregate activity on a regional basis, and finally determines the most highly active region. Subsequently, it only keeps track of node activity within that region to converge on the most active node, which is then selected as a victim node. In reality, these nodes are likely to be a memory controller or a node holding a last level cache slice. Figure 3.2 shows a 64 node network having a 2-stage victim selection process. This hierarchical design can be easily scaled to larger networks with negligible footprint by increasing the number of monitoring stages during victim selection.

3.2.3 Traffic Flow Manipulation

To ensure a stealthy attack, the trojan manipulates the traffic flow at each router that a flit passes through. The trojan specifically targets the stages of the router that involve contention in resource allocation. In this work, the hardware trojan is designed to exploit two specific stages of the router micro-architecture to realize the attack: Arbitration and Allocation. The goal of these modifications are to deny fair crossbar traversal slots for the flits originating from (or destined to) the victim node. The router performance under load is strongly dependent on the fairness and quality of these two stages. In both stages,

inducing minor delay by unfair resource allocation to flits originating/destined from/to victim IPs will remain inconspicuous and at the same time, inflicting flit delays at each hop will have a significant effect on the packet latency. This distributed model of traffic flow manipulation is harder to detect as it bears resemblance to delays due to resource contention and can be misinterpreted as traffic congestion related delays.

- *Arbiter*: The role of an arbiter is to resolve multiple requests to a single resource shared by many agents. In particular, arbiter allocates the virtual channel from input buffer to output buffers for flit traversal. Round Robin (RR) is one of the common mechanisms used, which allows flits to reserve the crossbar traversal slots uniformly. To enable the attack, the trojan circuit de-prioritizes the flits destined to (or sourced from) the victim node, deviating slightly from the uniform scheduling. Consequently, flits may be delayed at a given router for a pre-designated number of cycles. This delay must be restricted to a low number of cycles at each hop to prevent it from being perceived as anomalous behavior.
- *Allocator*: An allocator matches resources to requesters under constraints to allow flits to traverse through the crossbar. Flits must request the allocator for time slots for the switch traversal. By suppressing the request made by a flit from the victim node for a pre-determined number of cycles, the trojan induces a delay in allocation.

Since both stages are internal specifications of a router design, a SoC integrator will not be able to inspect its fairness or operation. Unfortunately, a 3PIP *rNoC* cannot be detected by internal signal inspection (e.g, [6]) as modern IP providers are reluctant to release their proprietary RTL containing the internal specifics of the IP design.

3.3 *rNoC*: Threat Model and Potency

A *rNoC* poses a potent threat on the economic health of SoC integrators, as well as, on other on-chip IP providers by directly controlling the perceived *availability* of various on-chip resources. The performance of various applications on an MPSoC can often depend heavily on a few IPs. For example, an application with a heavy memory footprint

has a strong dependence on the on-chip memory controllers, as well as, on SoC nodes with cache slices housing pertinent data. If the traffic to these nodes are thwarted by a *rNoC*, the application may suffer a substantial performance loss, resulting in potentially unhappy clients for the SoC integrators. In this scenario, only applications with high memory requirement suffers while other applications in the same network perform correctly. This inconsistent behavior, combined with the lack of non-invasive techniques to introspect the performance of each IP at runtime denounces the blame on a faulty memory controller, memory module or an inefficient integration of 3PIP components. Figure 3.3 shows a classic scenario for this threat, where the SoC integrator 4 may suffer a hefty business loss due to a *rNoC*.

3.3.1 Potency Evaluation Methodology

To evaluate the performance degradation seen by applications due to a focused bandwidth denial attack from a *rNoC*, Booksim2.0—a cycle-accurate interconnection network simulator—is used. Flit delays are simulated in the crossbar allocation stage, for those




Fig. 3.3: Threat scenario : 3PIP vendor sabotaging a SoC integrator. A NoC provider selectively provides a *rNoC* to one of its SoC integrators. Subsequently, the *rNoC* causes a bandwidth denial attack for applications running on the chip produced by the SoC integrator 4, damaging its reputation.

flits originating from a node under attack, and the average latency overhead of these packets are calculated. Booksim2.0 [64], coupled with network packet traces of multithreaded applications in the PARSEC suite released by Netrace0.9 [65] is used to simulate real world application behavior. To accurately model different degrees of the proposed distributed attack and to estimate the potency, a range of delays (e.g., one cycle to four cycle delay per flit at each hop) are inflicted on the flits belonging to the victim nodes. The results of these simulations are discussed next.

3.3.2 Results and Significance

Figure 3.4 shows the increase in packet latency caused by bandwidth denial attacks. The packet latency overhead ranges from 14.5% to 72%, based on the additional delay inflicted per hop. It can be observed that the latency degradation remains fairly consistent across benchmarks. These latency degradation directly translate to application performance degradation in modern many-core systems, with rudimentary in-order cores that are unable to hide on-chip communication latency. Given this remarkable threat potency from a *rNoC* design on future MPSoC platforms, it is important to investigate the feasibility and stealth of the trojan design embedded in the 3PIP NoC module.

3.3.3 Area and Power Footprint

The area and power footprint of the RTL design is carefully investigated to better comprehend the trojan's feasibility. To evaluate the overhead of the Trojan design footprint in a NoC, the RTL of an open-source Stanford Verilog model of a modern NoC router [66] is augmented with the modules described in Section 3.2. The router is used as a part of a mesh topology with 5-input/output ports (4 cardinal directions + 1 local) and 5 virtual channels in each port. The RTL design is synthesized with the TSMC 45nm library using Synopsys Design Compiler. Synthesis results show that the embedded trojan design has negligible overheads of 4.32% and 0.014% in area and power, respectively. Hence a *rNoC* presents a potent threat to impact the performance while using a low design footprint.




Fig. 3.4: Application performance degradation due to *rNoC*. Communication latency degradation incurred due to bandwidth denial attack. [D1,D2,D3,D4] implies [1,2,3,4] cycle additional delay at each hop introduced by a 64-node *rNoC*.

3.3.4 Third-Party NoC IP Usage Trend

To fully comprehend the significance of *rNoC*, one needs to recognize the growth of third-party NoC IPs. In the past decade, the use of NoC IPs in SoCs has grown exponentially. The turn-key solutions provided by companies such as Sonics and Arteris enable design firms to improve their methodology and shorten time-to-market schedules by allowing ease of integration of different SoC components. NoC IPs are used increasingly in a wide array of market segments such as mobile phones, tablets, automotive and general purpose processing to name a few. In 2014, Gartner Inc—an independent technology research firm—has ranked NoC IP sales of Sonics as #7 based on Design IP revenue with a 44.8% profit growth compared to the previous year [67] and Arteris has experienced a growth in sales of 797% over the last few years [7]. Given this ubiquity of IC devices using NoCs, it becomes more important to preserve the trustworthiness and security of such systems. Hence, this work proposes a non-invasive runtime technique to detect focused bandwidth denial attacks in a 3PIP NoCs.

Chapter 4

Runtime Latency Auditor for NoCs (RLAN)

This chapter details the proposed runtime technique RLAN to detect traffic abnormalities in the NoC caused by a malicious NoC IP. While the performance degradation due to unfair bandwidth allocation is evident at the application level (Section 3.3), runtime detection of such malicious activities has several key challenges, outlined in Section 4.1. These challenges lay the foundation for the proposed technique RLAN (Section 4.2). *RLAN is a non-invasive technique that can work without any modification to a 3PIP NoC IP.* To realize this goal, the technique is integrated in the SoC firmware module that interfaces the processing element to the network interface (NI) of the NoC IP. Section 4.3 discusses the RLAN variants, while Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 outlines the scalability and role of SoC firmware design.

4.1 Design Challenges

The crux of the detection technique is to identify the latency elongation of network packets caused by a bandwidth denial attack. There are three key challenges in runtime detection, outlined next.

- *Understanding Attack Semantics:* An ongoing attack on any given node cannot be detected simply by comparing the latencies of various packets sourced (or destined) to that node. This is because, once under attack, there will be little anomaly in latencies between similar packets from/to the victim node, thereby defeating the purpose of the detection mechanism. Also, comparing latencies of other packets in the network will not serve the purpose due the difference in spatial and temporal characteristics of the network.

- *Limiting False Positives:* False positives may arise because the latencies of network packets between a given source-destination incur variations based on normal network level activities. In particular, in an MPSoC environment, different applications may coexist at different times, resulting in a wide variation in network level congestion during their runtime. As a result, RLANs must distinguish latency elongation due to normal network activities from those of malicious activities. Furthermore, claiming a 3PIP provider is engaged in malicious activities has potential legal implications, and therefore must be backed by strong irrefutable evidence.
- *Managing Overhead:* To create a practical solution technique, it is critical to manage its circuit-architectural overhead in terms of performance impact on other traffic, and area and power. With growing network size, scalability of the proposed technique is another important consideration. Several RLAN variants are explored to balance overhead and efficacy in Section 4.3.

4.2 Design of RLAN

The insight of the proposed RLAN design is that *packets traversing routes with significant overlap (spatial similarity) around the same time (temporal similarity) have comparable latencies*. Figure 4.1 gives a real world example to illustrate the concept. At 5PM, the time taken between the three routes between same source and destination varies. This is due to the difference in spatial traffic congestion (*spatial variation*). Comparing just the highlighted routes (similar routes) at 5PM and 3AM, it is seen that there is still a variation in the time taken for the travel. The difference in traffic congestion at different times is responsible for the effect (*temporal variation*). To counter these variations, RLAN uses routes with significant overlap. This phenomenon is exploited to devise the proposed solution. Essentially, given an existing packet, a *Proximal Analogous Packet (PAP)* is created by slightly altering the source and/or destination. PAP have similar priority and hop count to the original packets and contain information to help relate to their original counterparts. Subsequently, the latencies of the original packets are compared to their Pips and statistics

are gathered over a significant sample size to detect malicious activities. The proposed design involves two major steps: (a) Tagging timestamps (Section 4.2.1); and (b) Creating source/destination in RLAN (Section 4.2.2).

4.2.1 Tagging Timestamps

To compare latencies, during the operational phase of RLAN, all packets are tagged with a timestamp. Figure 4.2 illustrates the required design. During the operation, the PE forwards the data to be communicated to the SoC Firmware, where a clock module tags a timestamp and dispatches it to the NI for packetization and injection into the network. At a destination, the incoming packet is depacketized in the NI and forwarded to the SoC firmware where timestamps are extracted. By scrutinizing extracted timestamps, RLAN establishes healthy interconnect latency thresholds and detects irregularities in the NoC fabric. An auxiliary benefit obtained from tagging timestamps is isolation of communication time from the computation time in a SoC. This aids in dynamic assessment of




Fig. 4.1: Real world example to illustrate RLAN technique. RLAN solution works on a principle similar to road traffic. At 5PM, there is a variation in the time taken to reach a destination between three routes of same distance (**spatial variation**). Comparing the traffic at 5PM and 3AM, the time taken for the same route varies due to the difference in traffic at different time (**temporal variation**).

performance levels of different IPs as well.

4.2.2 Creating Source/Destination in RLAN

During the design of RLAN it was observed that there can be three subtle variations in the attack semantics. These variations in attack scenario outlined below are used to guide the creation of PAP. In particular, packets of a victim node may observe excess latency on their *egress path*, *ingress path*, or both. It turns out that these variations lead to intricate design implications for creating an effective PAP. Hence, it becomes essential to create topology aware monitoring packets to weed out false negatives. The proposed approach to tackle all of these variations are outlined next. An underlying theme of this approach is limiting the complexity through maximal use of local network activities and minimizing the need for global information.

- Scenario 1–Attack on ingress packets:** The trojan targets packets that are destined to the victim node (A). Figure 4.3(a) illustrates the operation of RLAN, where the victim node A's ingress packets suffer from latency elongation. Consider that node B sends a packet (X) to node A. A PAP is created and injected from B directed to one of the nodes (P) proximal to X's destination. When the PAP arrives at P, the SoC firmware




Fig. 4.2: Block diagram of SoC firmware with RLAN control. The SoC integrator augments the RLAN control logic in the SoC Firmware. The SoC Firmware pads a timestamp to the data before forwarding it to the NI for packetization.

identifies and re-injects it towards A. At A, the SoC firmware stores the arrival time and compares it with the arrival time of X. Repeated deviations of packet arrival times are flagged as abnormal network activities.

- **Scenario 2–Attack on egress packets:** The trojan targets packets originating from the victim node (A). In this scenario, a PAP cannot be injected from the same source as previously done, as all packets originating from the source are under attack (i.e, delayed). To tackle this case, a node close to the source is used as a proxy. Figure 4.3(b) illustrates the operation, where the original source A sends a signal to any one of the proximal nodes (P) every time it injects a packet (X). P interprets the signal and injects a PAP to the same destination (B) as that of (X). At B, the SoC firmware compares the arrival time and flags abnormal activity if repeated large deviations occur. The solution complexity is higher, as the proximal nodes are unaware of neighboring activities and need a signal from A. During the design of RLAN for this scenario, another solution was deliberated upon where PAP is injected as a reply to an original packet and their latency compared. But the solution is inaccurate due to variation in sporadic network congestion as the path taken by the two packets is different both spatially and temporally.
- **Scenario 3–Attack on egress & ingress packets:** In this scenario, the embedded trojan attacks all packets originating from and destined to the victim node. This variation escalates solution complexity further as PAPs should neither originate nor travel to the victim node directly. The first two solution variants are combined together to tackle the complexity. Here, the SoC firmware is responsible for sending a signal to generate an effective PAP, as well as, comparing arrival time of PAP. Figure 4.3(c) illustrates the operation. Consider A as the victim node. For the egress packets, a PAP is created at a node proximal to A and directed towards the destination. Whereas all flits that are destined to A are first sent to the proximal node before being re-injected towards A.




Fig. 4.3: Overview and operation of RLAN. *a)* Proximal nodes around the victim act as proxy destinations for PAPs. Source (B) sends a PAP to one of the proximal nodes (P), which is forwarded to the original packet destination (A). *b)* Proximal nodes around the victim act as proxy sources. Source (A) sends a signal to one of the proximal nodes (P), which injects a PAP to the destination (B). *c)* Nodes around the victim IP act as proxy sources (egress) and destinations (ingress). PAP path is spatially and temporally similar to that of the original packet.

4.3 Variants of RLAN

A particular design challenge in RLAN is managing its runtime overhead, as PAPs introduce additional resource contention in the system. On the other hand, speedy detection of trojan activity in a NoC is critical for the security assurance of the MPSoC. To perform a trade-off analysis between overhead and fast detection, an analytic model is established. The key insights behind this model are explained below.

- The RLAN technique is intermittently active. To model this behavior, a *test phase* (P) and *test length* (T) are defined. Further, P is defined as the time period of successive RLAN invocations, while T indicates the active duration of RLAN within P .
- To intuitively assess the overhead from RLAN, *detection factor* (df) is defined, which is the ratio T/P . A high df indicates that RLAN is active most of the runtime, and thus should incur a larger overhead.
- To assess the *detection point* (dp) of RLAN, two central aspects need to be considered: (a) required number of flits to make a decision (n); and (b) total runtime of the

program, modeled as m phases of length P . Both are application dependent, as n is driven by the packet injection rate (i) of the program. dp is the percentage of total runtime required to accurately identify the presence of the trojan.

$$df = \frac{T}{P} \quad (4.1)$$

$$dp = \frac{n}{df \times i} \times \frac{1}{mP} \quad (4.2)$$

Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2 presents the analytic model to explore the trade-off between dp and df . The first term of Equation 4.2 (for dp) denotes the total time for n samples to be taken, while mP in the second term shows the total runtime of the program. Ideally, the detection point should be low so that the embedded trojan can be quickly detected.

Figure 4.4 shows the variation of detection point across benchmarks for different RLAN configurations (based on df) that is used: 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.8. Two key patterns can be observed. Certain benchmarks (e.g. bodytrack, vips) have worse detection points compared to others. These benchmarks have low injection rates. Hence, RLAN takes a longer time to obtain the required samples to accurately identify the trojan. For a given benchmark, as the detection factor increases, the detection point reduces. The trade-off between detection factor and its incurred overhead is investigated in Section 6.5.

4.4 Scalability of RLAN

With increasing levels of integration, next generation system-on-chips will feature larger NoCs [68]. Hence, the solutions proposed to address the current issues must be scalable to the larger networks. The scalability of RLAN in terms of the increase in detection point is evaluated here. The detection points for three different network sizes are compared: 16 (4x4), 64 (8x8) and 256 (16x16) nodes. For this comparison, a detection factor of 0.5 and runtime of 10 minutes is considered. Figure 4.5 shows the increase in dp with




Fig. 4.4: Detection point comparison for variants of RLAN. Variation of the detection point (dp) across benchmarks with $n=100000$. Detection point is evaluated for the 4 RLAN variants represented by detection factors (df) of 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.8 (lower is better). The runtime is considered to be 10 minutes.

increase in network size. Since each node in the network has to be assessed individually, detection point increases as a factor of network size. It is observed that for a network consisting of 256 nodes, the average detection point is at 8.2% of the total runtime compared to 2% for 64 node NoC for the considered simulation parameters.




Fig. 4.5: Scalability of RLAN. Variation of detection point for three NoC sizes: 4x4, 8x8 and 16x16 for a detection factor (df) of 0.5 (lower is better).

4.5 Role of the SoC Firmware

The SoC firmware is an integral component of the proposed solution. Its role, listed next, helps to explore the design trade-offs to successfully realize RLAN.

- The SoC integrator must decide parameters (test length and test phase) to limit overhead. The SoC firmware must have provisions to hold the above test parameters and inject PAPs at suitable periods.
- In all scenarios, proximal nodes serve as proxy nodes to mask the original source/destination of the victim node. The SoC firmware must have the capability to inject, identify and forward PAPs. At the same time, it must encode adequate information to associate PAPs to their original counterparts, for arrival time comparison.
- Another prominent role is to accurately identify abnormal network activity. The SoC firmware must only flag repeated deviations and be able to distinguish abnormal activity from intermittent delays caused by sporadic congestion in the network.

These functions are implemented in a standard SoC OCP interface [69], and overhead from its synthesized hardware is evaluated in Section 6.5.

Chapter 5

Methodology

This Chapter describes the simulation infrastructure that combines multiple tools to obtain a rigorous and accurate analysis of the proposed trojan design and also the latency monitoring system to identify the presence of such a trojan.

A meticulous cross-layer methodology is employed combining application induced traffic simulation on a cycle-accurate NoC simulator with detailed circuit level analysis from the synthesized hardware.

Architecture Layer: First, a traditional NoC without any security features is considered as the baseline to evaluate the design cost. An open-source Stanford Verilog model of a modern NoC router [66] is used for this evaluation. Further, the NoC routers are assumed to be arranged as a 8x8 mesh topology (i.e, 64 nodes). The router has a 4 stage pipeline of route computation, virtual channel allocation, switch allocation and switch traversal. The RLAN technique is carefully modeled in Booksim 2.0 and real world application traces (PARSEC benchmarks) from Netrace0.9 [65] are simulated. The network latency overhead includes the effect of routing resource contention arising from the additional traffic introduced through the proposed techniques.

Circuit Layer: The area/power overheads of the *rNoC* design is evaluated by augmenting the open-source Stanford Verilog model of a modern NoC router, and subsequently synthesizing it using the Synopsys Design Compiler and a 45nm TSMC standard cell library. To assess the area/power overhead from the proposed techniques, the schemes are implemented in a standard SoC OCP interface [69], and subsequently the design footprint of the synthesized hardware is compared to the original footprint.

Chapter 6

Results

In this Chapter, the results on the efficacy of RLAN (Section 6.1) are discussed along with the area, power and performance overheads of RLAN (Sections 6.4 and 6.5).

6.1 Efficacy

Network Latency Differential (NLD) is the difference in packet latency between a PAP and its original counterpart. Figure 6.1 presents the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of PAPs with respect to NLD¹. The figure shows the CDF for four cases: a no-attack scenario (NA) and three attack scenarios (T1, T2 and T3 with 1, 2 and 3 cycle delay per hop per flit belonging to victim node). Figure shows that in the absence of a bandwidth denial attack (AVG_NA cluster), a large percentile of PAPs will have small to negligible NLDs. The NLD for no-attack scenario is a non-zero value as a PAP can be created only after the SoC firmware processes the original data. Further, the created PAP must travel in the same path as the original packet and contend for the same resources during this travel. The attack cases on the other hand, have a noticeable NLD due to the delay inflicted by the trojan at each hop. Hence, a clear distinction is seen between the CDF of no-attack case and the attack cases.

In Figure 6.2, it is observed that only 4% of packets have an NLD greater than 12 for the no-attack case (represented by point P1). However, during an attack, a significant percent of PAPs are expected to have a higher NLD. This contrast in an attack scenario, where more than 60% of packets have an NLD greater than the chosen NLD(12) is clearly noticeable (represented by point P2). Hence, there is a clear separation between a no-attack

¹To eliminate obvious noise, the presented data is truncated to a minimum NLD of 6.




Fig. 6.1: Efficacy of RLAN under single application environment. For a given NLD (x-axis), the y-axis shows the percentage of PAPs suffering equal of greater NLDs. Four different cases are presented: no-attack, and three attack scenarios, T1,T2, T3, with delay per hop as 1,2 and 3, respectively. All benchmarks are shown in lighter shade, with the average shown in the darker shade.

and attack scenario that enables the identification of a trojan by setting a threshold of CDF-NLD pair. For example, consider a threshold pair of 30-12 (CDF-NLD). This indicates that if more than 30 percentile of packets have a NLD of 12 during the sample period, the node under observation is said to be under attack. The selection of threshold is discussed further in Section 6.3. Figure 6.2 also shows that NLD values between 12 and 16 are suitable to accurately identify a trojan but the bandwidth to choose an appropriate threshold keeps reducing. For the simulated parameters in a single application scenario, choice of NLD beyond 16 may lead to a large number of false positive (FP) and false negative (FN).




Fig. 6.2: Magnified cross-section of Figure 6.1 for analysis. Figure illustrates the CDF-NLD threshold selection and analysis of false positives and false negatives.

6.2 Multiple Application Environment

Given that an MPSoC may have multiple co-scheduled applications, it is imperative to study the efficacy of the proposed schemes under such an environment. The proposed technique is subjected to rigorous testing by superimposing *heavy* random traffic with an injection rate of 0.25, on top of application induced traffic to simulate multiple applications running simultaneously. Figure 6.3 shows the CDF plot for such a situation. There is an observable amount of disturbance in the CDF compared to the results obtained for single application environment. A very high injection rate of 0.25 was chosen to simulate the network under significant load and carry out a worst case analysis to assess the performance of the proposed technique. Even under this scenario, a less but clear distinction is noticed between the attack and no-attack scenarios.

For example, in Figure 6.4 if the NLD of 12 is considered again, the percentage of packets above the NLD in the no-attack case increases to 8% (denoted by point M1). In contrast, for the three different attack scenarios, the corresponding percentile is still over 40% (denoted by point M2) for all benchmarks. It can be observed that the point M2 in the figure is obtained for a specific benchmark that observes significant disturbance due to co-scheduled applications and not the average of all benchmarks. This is done to limit the FP and FN that can arise due to a wrong choice of threshold. Another noticeable factor is that the NLD bandwidth for accurate trojan detection has reduced due to the increased variance in packet latency caused by increased traffic in the NoC (now between 12 and 14).




Fig. 6.3: Efficacy of RLAN under multi-program environment.




Fig. 6.4: Magnified cross-section of Figure 6.3 for analysis. Figure illustrates the selection of CDF-NLD threshold and analysis of false positives and false negatives.

6.3 CDF-NLD Threshold

To accurately identify the presence of a trojan, CDF-NLD threshold is carefully selected to minimize the FP and FN. In Figure 6.2 (single application), point P_1 denotes the maximum percentile of packets with NLD-12 under no-attack and P_2 denotes the percentile of packets having the same NLD (12) under an attack scenario. The difference in CDF for these two scenarios is more than 50%. By choosing a CDF threshold of 30% (for NLD 12), it is ensured that there are no FP or FN. Due to the clear distinction between no-attack and attack scenario, the CDF threshold of 16% can also be used for a NLD of 16. Hence, if more than 16% of packets have NLD greater than 16, the NoC's availability is said to be compromised by trojan activity.

Under the simultaneous application environment, it is seen that the contrast between no-attack and attack scenarios reduces considerably. Increased network traffic and interference due to multiple applications induces sporadic delays in the network. If the same threshold of 16% is retained for NLD of 16, it is observed that the false negative rate is 2.74% for ferret benchmark. Under this scenario, an attack having delay of 1 cycle per hop may not be flagged as trojan activity. By re-evaluating the threshold to 23%(CDF) for NLD of 12, zero FP and FN can be guaranteed. Figure 6.4 illustrates two threshold combinations that can result in accurate identification of trojan activity. Points (M_1, M_2) and $(M_3,$

M_4) denote the extremes of CDF for NLD of 12 and 14 respectively.

Table 6.1 presents the false positive(FP) and false negative(FN) rates in both single and multiple application environments. A CDF threshold of 30% is considered to assess the FP and FN rates for four different NLD values: 10, 12, 14 and 16. It is observed that for NLD value of 12, the FP and FN are zero in both environments. NLD of 10 results in a high false positive rate in the multiple application environment. Network congestion due to multiple application will result in sporadic delays which are wrongly flagged as trojan activity. On the other hand, selecting a high NLD threshold(16) can result in FN of 1.8% and 6.2% in the two environments.

6.4 Performance Overhead

Figure 6.5 presents a comparative analysis of performance overhead across different RLAN variants. The maximum overhead (10.48%) is seen in $x264$ when the detection factor is 0.8. This configuration ensures high detectability as the test is active for a majority of the application runtime. On an average, for $df = 0.8$, the overhead incurred is 5.47%. The variation in overheads for different benchmarks is due to the different injection rates of the applications. At low injection rates, the relative impact of PAP induced congestion is larger, resulting in higher RLAN overhead.

6.5 Area and Power

The overheads are evaluated by adding the security features in a standard SoC OCP

Table 6.1: False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates. FP and FN is shown with CDF threshold of 30% and four NLD values: 10, 12, 14 and 16 for both Single and multiple application environment.

| NLD | Single Application | | Multiple Application | |
|-----|--------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| | FP | FN | FP | FN |
| 10 | 2.13% | 0% | 17.88% | 0% |
| 12 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 14 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0.76% |
| 16 | 0% | 1.83% | 0% | 6.21% |




Fig. 6.5: Runtime Overhead of the RLAN technique. The performance overhead is evaluated for *detection factors* of 0.1, 0.25, 0.4 and 0.8.

interface [69]. RLAN incurs an area overhead of 12.73% due to the hardware for PAP creation and latency comparison. Table 6.2 shows the power overhead for different configurations of RLAN. The RLAN circuit is active only for the length of the test and is power gated for the rest of the application execution time. Hence, the detection factor plays a role in deciding the power overhead incurred. For a detection factor of 0.8, the RLAN circuit is active for 80% of the test phase and incurs a power overhead of 9.84%.

Table 6.2: Power Overhead due to RLAN configurations. The standard OCP interface is considered as the baseline.

| <i>df</i> | 0.1 | 0.25 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Power Overhead | 1.49% | 3.28% | 6.26% | 9.84% |

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This research explores a novel security threat stemming from the pervasive use of 3PIP NoC, where a rogue NoC can disrupt the perceived on-chip resource availability. The following contributions are made to the domain of 3PIP NoC security.

- Established a potent and covert threat model in the on-chip communication infrastructure that can have a significant impact on application performance.
- Implemented a detailed design of a rogue NoC, analyzed its design footprint and threat significance to demonstrate that a potent *rNoC* design is feasible with negligible footprint and scalable to larger networks.
- Designed a non-invasive technique (**RLAN**) to systematically monitor trustworthiness of a 3PIP NoC during runtime and effectively counter the emerging security threat.
- Analyzed the circuit-architectural impact of the proposed monitoring scheme under realistic environments and showed that the proposed solution can provide security assurance with modest overheads of 12.73% in area, 9.34% in power and 5.4% in terms of network latency.

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